

## THE TARIFF AND THE FARMERS.

Letter to a Farmer of Ohio.

From The Plains, the Locusts, the Avails.

DEAR SIR: You ask me what are the prospects for the farmer. You are discouraged by the present low price of wheat, and desire to know if there is any remedy in prospect. If there is not, you are, as you say, disposed to sell your farm, and follow the example of your neighbors, in emigrating to California or Oregon.

That such should be your state of feeling does not surprise me. You are disappointed in your sanguine calculations as to the results which were to follow the adoption of the system known in Manchester and Birmingham by the name of free trade, and which looks to compelling the farmer and planter of the world to sell all their products in one market, and to buy all their cloth and their iron in that same market, kept by the men who teach this British free trade. Twenty years since, as I well recollect, you had a strong belief in the advantage that must result to the farmer from bringing the loom and the anvil to take their natural places by the side of the plow and the harrow; but then, as you will well recollect, protection to the American farmer and laborer constituted a part of the Democratic creed, while old-fashioned Federalism repudiated the idea that spindles and looms might be as advantageous to a nation as wagons and ships. It was then no heresy to believe with JEFFERSON that the time had arrived when we must place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist; nor with MADISON, that it was not only constitutional, but expedient, to protect the farmer and the planter in their efforts to draw around them consumers of their products; nor with JACKSON, that it was greatly to the interest of farmers and planters that a larger portion of our population should be enabled to devote themselves to the production of iron and of cloth, and a smaller one be required to give themselves to the production of food and raw materials, thus bringing the consumer to the side of the producer. You then thought with ADAM SMITH, that the natural place for the artisan was in the neighborhood of the producer of the food and the wool; where both were cheap, and where he might have abundant supplies of food in exchange for the labor employed in converting the wool into cloth, and thus fitting it for cheap transportation to distant markets. In a piece of cloth, said Smith, there are many hundred weights of food and wool; and a system which looked to compelling the farmer to export his products in their original forms he regarded as being "a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind." So you, too, regarded it; and therefore it was that you so fully agreed with JACKSON, that we had been "too long subject to the policy of British merchants," and that the day had arrived when we should convert our food and the other raw materials that so much abound into commodities that could be cheaply carried to any market of the world, instead of permitting ourselves to be compelled to perform all our trade with the world through the medium of the looms and the shops of England. Since that day, however, "a change has come over the face of the dream" of many of our politicians, and Manchester free trade has taken the place of protection to the American farmer and laborer; the former being now regarded as highly Democratic, and the latter as little better than old-fashioned Federalism; and yet, if we examine the records of the Hartford Convention, we shall find there the same admiration for ships and foreign trade, and the same dislike for all attempts to limit the necessity for depending on distant markets, now manifested by the men of the modern Democratic school. Times change, and men change with them; and so it is with parties. The Democracy of to-day stands on ground directly opposed to that on which stood the one of thirty years since.

Strong as were your convictions that you and your brother farmers were to be benefited by protection, you were yet greatly dazzled by the idea of the total removal of restrictions on trade; and that you should have been so is not extraordinary, for there is certainly something pleasant in the idea of universal peace and universal freedom of intercourse. At length came the repeal of the English corn laws, regarded universally as a boon to the food-producers of the world, who were to inundate the English market with their products, and to have higher prices for the greater quantity they sent. Our own exports of "breadstuffs and provisions" were, as Mr. Walker so confidently assured us, to rival in amount those of cotton. "Great even as those were destined to be under a system of low duties" on foreign fabrics. Our high duties had, he told us, closed the markets of Europe against our food, and to such an extent that nothing short of a famine could open them; but now, by freely admitting the manufactures of England and of Europe, we were to be enabled to feed "the starving millions" of the eastern hemisphere, whose demands were to absorb the whole of the vast "surplus" for which we then needed a market; and the extent of that surplus was, we were assured, not less than four hundred millions of bushels. Absurd as such statements now appear, they were then put forth with the utmost gravity through the medium of Patent-Office Reports, which constituted, as we may suppose, the basis upon which rested the still more absurd calculations issued from the Treasury in relation to the foreign trade, in accordance with which our exports of food, cotton, tobacco, &c., were to increase at the rate of almost fifty per cent. per annum, as follows:

In 1848 they were expected to reach.....\$229,898,353  
In 1849 they were expected to reach.....329,300,993  
In 1850 they were expected to reach.....428,433,036

In the present year they would be bound, agreeably to this estimate, to reach a thousand and fifty millions; almost one-half of which would consist of breadstuffs and provisions. How far these anticipations have been realized will be seen by an examination of the following figures exhibiting the export of food:

In 1846-7.....\$18,000,000 In 1849-50.....\$36,371,030  
1847-8.....37,294,000 1850-51.....21,948,000  
1848-9.....36,765,000

Instead of increasing at the rate of fifty per cent. every year, it has declined to less than one-third of the amount at which it stood five years since, notwithstanding a growth of population amounting to at least four millions.

Nor is this all. There is a portion of the world that we are bound, to a certain extent, to supply with food, and that trade has little, very little to do with the question of protection. For supplying Cuba and Brazil we have advantages resulting from proximity that enable us to compete advantageously with all other parts of the world, and therefore it is, that that trade continues so steady in amount as compared with that which we maintained with the "great grain-market of the world," in which we exchange raw products for manufactured ones, as is here shown:

Breadstuffs and Provisions.....\$18,000,000  
To Great Britain.....\$18,180,000  
1846-48.....22,000,000 1849-50.....15,000,000  
1848-50.....19,271,000 1850-51.....14,100,000  
1850-51.....8,104,000 1851-52.....13,841,000

The trade with Great Britain is an artificial one, and therefore it is that it is subject to so great variation. The other is a natural one, and therefore it is that it is so steady.

The last year was one of remarkable failure in the crops of Central Europe, and famines prevailed there to an extent that was most deplorable, and

yet "the starving millions" were quite unable to buy from us, as is shown in the following statement of exports for the first three quarters of the fiscal year 1851-52, in which are included all descriptions of food, the product of the grain-growing States, sent to the Continent:

Wheat.....\$3,944,000  
Rye.....1,100,000  
Barley.....1,100,000  
Oats.....1,100,000  
Flour.....1,100,000  
Total.....\$8,244,000

Recollect, I beg of you, that these are the total exports of food to France, which supplies us with millions upon millions of dollars' worth of silks and other articles that could be made at home by people who would consume home-grown food—that they include those to Belgium and Germany, who inundate us with foreign wool and food in the form of cloth—those to Russia, in whose favor we have almost destroyed the growth of hemp in West—and those to Spain, in whose favor we have so far reduced the production of lead, that the total exports of the West via New Orleans have fallen from 800,000 pigs in 1846, to less than 300,000 in the year just closed—and then answer for yourself what are the causes of the decline of wheat of which you now complain. Is it not clear, that if we raised our own wool, and made our own cloth, and grew our own hemp, and mined our own lead, and our cloth-makers, and hemp-growers, and lead-miners would be consumers of food, instead of being producers of it? If our policy tend now to make them so, instead of tending, as it does, to drive our whole population into the raising of food, should we not thereby be carrying out the views you once so much admired when they came from the pen of General Jackson?

Compare this table, I pray you, with the magnificent promises of Mr. Walker—and then recollect that this is the demand upon us for the supply of the whole continent of Europe at a period of positive famine—after which determine for yourself what are the prospects of the farmer for future years, when crops shall be abundant. The truth is, that there is really no foreign market for our food worthy of notice, except that natural one which consists in supplying countries whose climate unfits them for growing wheat or corn. Russia and Germany, Spain and Portugal, France and Italy have food to sell; and it would be as judicious to look to Pittsburgh or Mauch Chunk for a market for coal, as to any country in Continental Europe for a market for our food; and yet it is there that we find "the starving millions" that Mr. Walker was to feed with our vast "surplus." England is the only food-importing country of Europe to which we have any exports that can in the smallest degree affect prices; and you have seen how steadily and regularly the amount is declining, that of 1850-51 having been only eight millions of dollars, whereas that of 1848-49, long subsequent to the Irish famine, was about twenty-four millions. The first three quarters of the last fiscal year give about \$8,700,000, as the exports to that period of famine in some of the most important countries from which she has been accustomed to obtain supplies of food; and even this small amount of trade we should not have had but for the very low prices of wheat and of flour among ourselves during the past year.

The former is now selling in New-York at about 90 cents a bushel, and the latter at about \$4 a barrel, and yet there is no export demand, nor can there be while America flour sells in England at from 18s. to 20s. (\$1 32 to \$1 86) a barrel; and there is far more chance for a fall than for any permanent rise in European prices. What the manufacturers of Birmingham and Manchester desire is cheap food, and to obtain it they have opened the markets of England to all the world at all times, the effect of which has been to reduce the price of wheat to 30s. or 40s. a quarter, or from 90 cents to \$1 per bushel of 60 lbs.; and now the landholders are everywhere exerting themselves to meet the reduction of prices by increasing the production, while the population is diminishing in actual quantity. Examine *The Times*, *The Economist*, *The Manchester Guardian*, or almost any of the free trade papers, and you will find accounts of extraordinary improvements in the modes of cultivation, by means of thorough drainage and the application of the most fertilizing manures. What is sought to be accomplished is a reduction in the price of food; and *The Times* newspaper now assures its readers, that so great have been the improvements in the past five years, there need in future be but little anxiety felt in regard to the character of the seasons, the farmers of England having almost placed themselves out of the reach of danger from any such changes; and if this be the case, it is clear that you have but little to hope for in the future. The population of England has certainly ceased to increase, and as certainly she is rapidly improving her agriculture, so as to supply herself with food. Our population is increasing at the rate of a million a year, and we are driving the whole increase into agriculture, with a view to supply "the great food market of the world;" and if this course of operation do not lead to a general and great reduction in the price of food, it will be one of the most remarkable facts of modern times.

One of the reasons for adopting the Manchester system of free trade was found in the fact that England had repealed her corn laws, and yet that was precisely the reason why we should more pertinaciously have insisted on pursuing a policy tending to make a market on the land for the products of the land. So long as the admission of grain into England was only occasional, and prices varied greatly from one year to another, our farmers were in the position of the speculator who has control of the telegraph. We had fast

on the ocean, and railroads at home, and were always ready to avail ourselves of the changes that might take place; while the people of the Continent, always slow in their movements, were not. Now, however, the market is always open, and there is a steady stream of food pouring into England, and the fast ship or nation and the slow one are on a dead level with each other—Russia having every advantage that is enjoyed by ourselves. The consequence of this has been, that while prices have risen in Germany, Poland and Russia, they have fallen here, and while they are daily acquiring means for the making of roads, we are forced to go abroad to borrow them. Every day tends to put them more and more on a level with us, and tends to render it more and more impossible that we should supply any part of Europe with food, except at lower prices than we yet have seen. Low as they have been in the last year, our whole export to England since the first of September last, now nearly 12 months, is but about nine millions of bushels, as follows: Flour, 1,223,533 barrels; wheat, 2,474,543 bushels; corn, 1,442,652 bushels; and yet it is for such a market as that that we have exchanged the domestic one so rapidly increasing under the tariff of 1842.

You will ask, "What is the remedy for a state of things so very ruinous to the farmer?" For an answer to this question, I would beg you to refer to the old-fashioned democracy of Jefferson, Madison and Jackson, which taught, that if the farmer would prosper, he must bring the consumers to his side, and thus make a market on the land for its products. You will say, however, that our "surplus" is great, and that we must continue a food-exporting country; and yet it would require but a very little examination to as-

erty you how great a fallacy is involved in such an assertion. The whole market of England has taken in the last year, almost one of famine in Germany, only nine millions of bushels; and if we estimate the average yield of labor at only 500 bushels of wheat or corn, the absorption by that market is equal to the product of 18,000 men. Now, in the last five years we have driven into agriculture at least a million of men, one-half of whom would have been better pleased to engage themselves in some other pursuit, as they would have done had our policy looked to the building of mills and furnaces, and the opening of mines instead of the closing of them. One hundred thousand men withdrawn from agriculture would have made a diminution in the number of producers far exceeding the number required for the production of our whole export of food to all parts of the world; and one hundred thousand added to the number of consumers would have made a demand fifty times greater than that which is furnished you by the whole people of the continent of Europe, who now furnish us with wool, hemp, lead, cloth, silks, and other commodities, to the annual extent of fifty millions of dollars.

Our export of farm produce to all the world does not amount to 1 per cent. of the crop. Now, if we have already a market for 98 per cent., is it not clear that if we adopted Gen. Jackson's idea, and allowed a larger portion of our population to go into other pursuits, we could speedily make a market for the remaining one and a half per cent., first by diminishing the producers, and next by increasing the consumers and the power of consumption? Is it not clear even that we might readily make a market for food to such an extent as would make it profitable to import it from Canada for domestic consumption, and would not our domestic prices then be higher than those abroad by the whole cost of transportation? If you have any doubts of this, let me ask you to reflect on the following facts:—In 1842, we produced about 200,000 tons of iron, not a ton of which could be made into railroad iron, for we had no machinery for the purpose. In 1846, we made, as stated by Secretary Walker, 850,000 tons, seventy or eighty thousand tons of which were converted into railroad bars. Now, if we value this additional 600,000 tons, in its various forms of rails, axles, spikes, stoves, railroad bars, &c., &c., at an average of \$100 per ton, we have a value of sixty-five millions of dollars, to be given in exchange for food and clothing of the persons employed in building furnaces and mills, in opening mines and digging ore, in smelting the ore, and in the thousand operations required for bringing the iron into the forms fitting it for consumption. Again, in 1842 we converted into cloth 265,000 bales of cotton, and five years after the quantity had almost doubled, while the domestic consumption of wool had risen from 55 to 80 millions of pounds, and the additional value given by labor to this additional cotton and wool may safely be placed at thirty millions of dollars, all of which went to pay for the food and clothing and house-room of laborers employed in the various operations connected with the manufacture, from the building of the mill and the construction of the engine to the finishing of the cloth. In 1842 we mined 1,100,000 tons of coal, worth at market from 40 to 50 cents a ton; but in 1847 it had risen to three millions of dollars; but in 1847 it had risen to three millions of dollars; and every dollar of this went, in one way or another, to the purchase of the fruits of the earth. Again, in 1842 the West sent to market 470,000 pigs of lead. In 1846 it had reached 800,000; and here we have an additional market for food to the extent of the value of these 330,000 pigs. In 1841-2 Kentucky sent to market 1,311 bales of hemp. In 1846-7 it had reached 60,000 bales. Now it is quite clear that the people who made this iron and cloth, and those who mined this coal, and mined and smelted this lead, and raised this hemp, would have been compelled to raise food for themselves and for sale, if they could not have employed themselves in mills and furnaces, mines and hemp-fields; and equally clear is it that they furnished a market greater than that which had existed in 1842 for the products of the earth, to the extent of at least one hundred millions of dollars, or four times more than we now export to all the world.

At the date of the passage of the tariff of 1842 we made little iron or cloth. Mills and furnaces were everywhere closed; the making of roads was suspended; banks, corporations and States were bankrupt; and the General Government was seeking in vain to obtain in London, Paris, or Amsterdam, a loan of a few millions to defray our expenses in a period of profound peace. We had closed the mills and furnaces in the hope to obtain a market abroad, and the sort of market we did obtain may be seen from the following statement of our export of the products of the grain-growing States for 1841-2:

Exports of Food.....\$1,253,227  
Beef and Pork, tons.....15,333 \$3,423,041  
Butter and Cheese, tons.....3,850 1,053,007  
Wheat, bushels.....1,013,795 1,261,275  
Flour, barrels.....1,238,602 7,375,336  
Corn, bushels.....600,308 345,150  
Corn Meal, barrels.....109,199 617,817  
Rye Meal, barrels.....148,725 743,725  
Horses, Mules, Biscuits, &c.....34,120 251,474

Total.....\$14,265,037  
Recollect, I pray you, that this was the market afforded by all the world for the food produced in the six New-England States, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Missouri—eighteen in all; so that the foreign market, under a system of merely revenue duties, amounted to \$800,000 per State, or about 75 cents per head. Five years afterward, under the tariff of 1842, we had created a domestic market for food amounting to not less than one hundred millions of dollars, yet we exported almost twice as much, as is here shown:

Exports of Food.....\$1,253,227  
Beef and Pork, tons.....15,333 \$3,423,041  
Butter and Cheese, tons.....3,850 1,053,007  
Wheat, bushels.....1,013,795 1,261,275  
Flour, barrels.....1,238,602 7,375,336  
Corn, bushels.....600,308 345,150  
Corn Meal, barrels.....109,199 617,817  
Rye Meal, barrels.....148,725 743,725  
Horses, Mules, Biscuits, &c.....34,120 251,474

Total.....\$24,295,438  
Recollect, if you please, that up to this date there had been no sign of potato-rat, no sign of Irish famine, and then remark that the export had increased seventy per cent., and this, too, under a system of protection that was, as we are told, to destroy our commerce with the world. In the face of crops unexampled in the history of the country, pork and beef had risen from \$74 to \$89 per ton; butter and cheese had trebled in quantity, and risen in price from \$172 to \$175; corn had risen from 57 to 61c., and corn-meal from \$3 to \$3 30; while wheat, which had almost doubled in quantity in this brief period, fell from \$1 12 to \$1 01; and flour from \$6 to \$5 09.

As yet, however, the country was but beginning to recover from the calamities of the period of 1841-2. It had required a long period to get into operation the old mills, furnaces, and mines. closed in 1842, and still more time was needed to bring about the state of things required to promote the building or opening of new ones; and if we desired to ascertain the real effect of the tariff of 1842, we should seek it in 1847, or even 1848, for up to this latter year the tariff of 1842 remained almost entirely inoperative.

Side by side with the last year of the tariff of 1842, I now place the last year of the tariff of

1846, under which the demand for food to "feed the hungry" of Europe was to rise to hundreds of millions of dollars, with great augmentation of prices:

Exports of Food.....\$1,253,227  
Beef and Pork, tons.....15,333 \$3,423,041  
Butter and Cheese, tons.....3,850 1,053,007  
Wheat, bushels.....1,013,795 1,261,275  
Flour, barrels.....1,238,602 7,375,336  
Corn, bushels.....600,308 345,150  
Corn Meal, barrels.....109,199 617,817  
Rye Meal, barrels.....148,725 743,725  
Horses, Mules, Biscuits, &c.....34,120 251,474

Total.....\$24,295,438  
Beef and pork here have decreased in quantity, with a trivial increase of price; butter and cheese have increased sixty per cent. in quantity, while the total value has grown six per cent.; wheat has diminished in both quantity and price; flour has fallen off in quantity, and price has fallen to \$4 75. The yet more valuable articles of export have declined more than one-half; while corn—the corn that should have been manufactured into pork—has almost doubled, with large diminution of price; and this has happened under a system that was to give us a demand for food to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Recollect now, if you please, that from 1842 to 1847 we quadrupled our domestic production of iron, trebled that of coal, doubled that of cotton cloth, and added at least one-half to that of woolen cloth, to say nothing of vast increase in the production of wool, hemp, lead, and the thousand other commodities that before we had imported, and then remark that although we had then made a domestic market amounting to more than a hundred millions of dollars, we exported in 1846-7 about twice as much food as we had done in 1841-2, when our mills and furnaces were closed. Next I would beg you to remark, that for the last four years we have built neither furnaces nor mills, but that we have closed hundreds of old ones; and that a large proportion of them has been sold out by the sheriff, a specimen of whose operations for the present year is given in the following paragraph, which meets my eye while engaged in writing this letter:

TRADE IN PENNSYLVANIA.—The Clarion County Register publishes seven columns of Sheriff's Sales among the property to be sold under the hammer will be about twenty-three furnaces sold in that County by the Sheriff within a year. The whole industry of Clarion County is devoted by these dealers, as it is shown by the fact that nearly all the rest of the property to be sold at this Sheriff's Sale which is advertised in *The Register* consists of grist-mills, saw-mills, and filling and other mills.

We have reduced the production of iron to less than half a million of tons, and the consumption of cotton and of wool has greatly fallen off, while the lead received at New Orleans has fallen from 800,000 to 300,000 pigs, and the hemp from Kentucky has fallen from 60,000 to 19,000 bales; and thus have we diminished the amount of the domestic market for food at least fifty millions of dollars, while adding four or five millions to our population; and the foreign market, instead of growing, has largely diminished. Having studied these facts, you can, as I think, have little difficulty in determining for yourself the cause of the low price of wheat. Whenever we open a mine, or build a mill or a furnace, we add to the number of those who are only consumers of food, and every addition to the number of consumers tends to raise prices. Whenever we stop the building of mills, or furnaces, or close old ones, we compel men to become producers of food, and every addition to the number of producers tends to reduce prices. Here are plain, simple propositions, of the truth of which you are as competent to judge as I am, and if you deem them true, as I think you must, it would seem scarcely possible that you should fail to arrive to a correct understanding of the true causes of the difficulty of which you and other farmers complain.

It will be said, however, that the farmer should have the choice of markets, and not feel himself compelled to sell either at home or abroad. Undoubtedly he should, and the object of protection is to secure to him that choice. The British system looks to compelling all the farmers and planters of the world to bring their surplus produce to British ports, that it may be eaten by British workmen, and the people of Manchester and Birmingham have succeeded in accomplishing that object in reference to all the countries with which they have what they call free trade. Ireland has perfect freedom of trade, as it is called; she has, consequently, no consumers, and her farmers have no choice but to send everything to the one market of England; whereas, if she made largely of iron and of cloth, her people would have two markets, the home and the foreign, and they could sell in one or the other, as they might deem it most to their advantage. India has seen her manufactures pass gradually away as British free trade has obtained the control of her movements, and with each step in that direction she has become more and more dependent on the single market of England. So too with Portugal and Turkey, both of which have subjected themselves to Manchester free trade, which consists in allowing them but one market in which to sell, and one in which to buy. The West Indies were not allowed even to refine their own sugar, lest they might have two markets in which to sell or to buy. So too with Canada and Nova Scotia; they have no home market, because, under British free trade, the consumer cannot take his place by the side of the producer. Wherever British free trade prevails, the agriculturist has no choice of markets.

The near market is the great one, and the distant one is the small one. If you desire evidence that such is the case, I would beg you to look only to the fact, that the consumption of food among the domestic manufacturers of iron and cloth, and the domestic miners of lead and coal, and the domestic producers of machinery for mining and manufactures, increased in four or five years, under the tariff of 1842, more than a hundred millions of dollars, and would certainly, in the last five years, have increased as much more; whereas, under the tariff of 1846, it has diminished at least fifty millions of dollars, and yet the foreign market is scarcely greater in amount than it was twelve or twenty years since, as is here shown, The

Export of food, rice included, in 1830 was.....\$17,532,227  
Export of food, rice included, in 1840 was.....19,067,335  
Export of food, rice included, in 1850 was.....27,701,121  
Export of food, rice included, in 1851 was.....34,943,000

The first was a period of high protection, when the domestic market was rapidly increasing; the second was that of the strictly revenue tariff of twenty per cent. duties, when the domestic market had almost disappeared; the third was one of high protection, when mills and furnaces were everywhere being built; and the last is one of British free trade, when mills and furnaces are being sold by the sheriff. In this period the population had nearly doubled, and yet the export of food is, as we see, but about and a third more than it was twenty years since.

Again, admitting the possibility that the foreign market could be increased, the question would arise, which is the best one? In reply to this, I would beg you to remark, that every farmer understands that he it is that pays the cost of transportation, and therefore it is that he is as anxious to have a railroad. You know well that, in former times, when roads were bad, you sold your wheat at twenty cents a bushel, although it was then worth eighty or ninety cents, or perhaps even a dollar, in Philadelphia or New-York. Since then the modes of transportation have been improved, and the price in Ohio is now but two or fifteen

cents less than in Philadelphia or New-York. You paid the cost of transportation then, and now you profit by the saving in the cost. That admitted, let us see why it is that it is higher now in New-York than in Ohio. Clearly, because you have paid for carrying it to market. Again, why is it that it is higher in Liverpool than in New-York? As clearly because you have paid for carrying it there. If it could be transported to Liverpool without cost, you would obtain the whole of the price at which it sold, minus commission; but as it cannot, you pay the cost of transportation. That understood, I would now ask you what it is that regulates the price in New-York? Is it not the price that can be obtained for the trivial quantity that must go to Liverpool—"the surplus" as it is called? Do not prices go up in New-York and Boston, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Ohio and Illinois, just as the markets of England rise or fall? Is it not boasted in that country that "Mark-Lane governs the world's prices," and is it not true that such is the case? Certainly it is; and yet the whole quantity of our food that is absorbed by English demand does not amount to one per cent. of the quantity that is raised in the country; and it is for the sake of finding a market for that one per cent. that you close the coal and iron mines of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and make yourselves dependent on a foreign market for all your supplies of cloth and iron. Be assured it would be more advantageous to have that food than to permit it to fix the price of the crop as now it does.

That such is the fact you can, I think, convince yourself, if you examine how it is that prices are affected by a necessity for going to a distance either to buy or to sell. In some parts of the country farmers have been selling their potatoes for more than a dollar a bushel, for the reason that the local demand was greater than the local supply, and thus a necessity for going abroad to purchase five or ten per cent. of the quantity required for consumption has raised the price of the whole to the level of the cost of the small quantity needed from a distance. In other quarters potatoes quite as good might be purchased for forty or fifty cents, for the reason that the local supply was greater than the local demand; and thus a necessity for going abroad to sell a small proportion of the quantity produced, diminishes the price of the whole crop to the level of that which can be obtained for "the surplus" that must go to the distant market; and this state of things must continue with all these potato-growers, so long as they must rely on two markets—the near and the distant. So it is with the producers of food throughout the Union: so long as they must depend on the distant market for however small a quantity of their products—so long as they have not the power to choose between the near and the distant market—so long the price they can obtain in that distant market for a "surplus" that is most insignificant in amount, and that does not equal one per cent. of the whole crop, must govern the price of the whole. Make a market on the land for its products, acquire power to determine between the distant and the near markets, and prices will rise to a level with those of English markets. Increase the power of consumption, and thus make a market for a triding quantity more than is raised, and prices will rise to that degree which is required for importing the food of Canada, or of Russia. If you desire to see this proved in practice, let me beg of you to look to what is now going on with regard to beef and pork, the production of which diminishes as your people are more and more forsaking your State and the adjoining ones, and flying to Oregon and California. Ohio has not now as many hogs or cattle as it had three years since, and the consequence is, that the home production of pork and beef has fallen to a level with the home demand, and you have high prices, because you are much less dependent on the distant market. Diminish the supply and increase the demand, and prices will rise, because your dependence on the distant market will still further diminish. The object of the tariff of 1842 was that of producing power over our own actions, and diminishing our dependence on those of others; the object of that of 1846 is that of diminishing our power and increasing our dependence. The one tended to bring consumption up to a level with production, with constant tendency to improvement in the condition of the farmer; the other tends to convert all our consumers into producers, with constant tendency to deterioration of the condition of farmer, planter, laborer, and mechanic; and that it does produce that effect, is seen by the fact, that although we have added four or five millions to our population, we now consume a far less quantity of iron and far less quantities of cotton and woolen goods than we did five years since; and yet we then paid in our products for all we consumed, and now we go in debt for cotton and woolen goods, silks and iron, at the rate probably of a hundred thousand dollars per day.

The object of British free trade is to prevent the people of any part of the world from exchanging with each other except through the ships and the warehouses, the mills and the furnaces of England. The people of India cannot exchange with each other for cotton, without first sending both to Manchester; the consequence of which is, that the producer of rice goes naked, and the producer of cotton perishes of famine—almost the whole of their products being eaten up in the cost of transportation. The producer must support the middlemen, and the more of them that there are to be paid, the poorer he must be. The planter of Tennessee cannot exchange his cotton with his neighbor of Ohio or Illinois, for corn or pork, without first sending both to Manchester; and the consequence is, that he obtains but one bale of coarse cloth in exchange for five bales of cotton, when he should have one bale for two. He has too many middlemen to pay. You cannot exchange your products for cloth, until after both the cotton and the corn shall have traveled thousands of miles, that the latter may be passed through the stomach of an English artisan, who would do twice as much work for the same quantity of food if he were brought to the neighborhood of your farm. You receive little cloth for your corn because you have too many middlemen to pay.

The whole tendency of the policy of England is toward the subjugation of the farmers and planters of the world. She desires to buy cotton cheap and sell cloth dear—to buy food cheap and to sell iron dear; and she accomplishes her object wherever she has power, as is seen in the utter ruin of Ireland, India, Turkey, the West Indies and Portugal—the favored lands of Manchester free trade.

Having examined the condition of these countries, I would next beg you to look to the fact, that Russia, which is daily increasing in strength, is a country in which the farmer is protected in efforts to bring the loom and the spindle to the side of the plow and the harrow; and that there we find a most rapid increase in the consumption of cotton and other of the raw products of distant countries—that Belgium, the very paradise of protection, is advancing in strength and wealth with great rapidity—and that Germany, since the adoption of protection in 1835, has increased her consumption of cotton more than three hundred per cent., and that her people consume more than twice as much iron per head as they did when they had what was called free trade. Fifteen

years since, it was supposed that Germany must always have a large "surplus" of wool to go to England; and yet so rapidly has the domestic manufacture increased, that the export has almost ceased, and she is now a large importer of other wools to mix with her own. Formerly, most of her wool and her food had to pass through the ships and mills of England, because there was no power to choose between the near market and the distant one, and the price of the whole crop was fixed by that which could be obtained for the quantity sent to the market of Leeds, minus the cost of transportation. Now she imports foreign wools, and the price at home of the whole crop is determined by the cost of obtaining the small quantity needed from abroad; and she now has direct trade with all the world, because she combines her food and her wool in the form of cloth, in accordance with the views of Adam Smith, the father of free trade, and the opponent of what is now known as Manchester free trade.

The nation that desires free trade must place itself in a position to finish its commodities so as to fit them for consumption. It can then have a thousand outlets, whereas, when it does not so finish them, it must trade through the medium of the owners of the mills and steam-engines. Had you no grist-mills in the West, you would be compelled to make all your exchanges with consumers at home and abroad through the mills of the East. Ireland and India, Portugal and Turkey have little or no machinery, and they are forced to perform all their exchanges through England; and such was the case with ourselves until protection was adopted in 1828. At that time it would have been deemed the height of absurdity to suppose that we could ever supply other people than ourselves with cotton and food compressed into the form of cotton cloth; and yet we are now large exporters of cottons, and our exports of manufactured goods have risen to a level with our exports of vegetable food of all descriptions to all parts of the world. We see, then, that "protection" has produced with us the same effect that it has produced in Germany—that is, it has reduced the price of manufactured goods so far as to enable us to send them into foreign markets. Seventeen years since, Germany sold her wool and bought cloth, and the producers of the first obtained low prices for the one, and gave high prices for the other. Now she buys wool and sells cloth, and her domestic producers of wool obtain high prices for the one, while they obtain the other at low ones. Seventeen years since, the people of Germany obtained their hardware from Birmingham, for which they paid, of course, British prices plus the cost of importation: now they manufacture hardware, and they themselves are so cheaply supplied, that they are enabled to sell it even in Birmingham. Protection has, therefore, produced competition for the purchase of the raw products of the earth, and for the sale of manufactured ones, thus raising the prices of the one, and lowering those of the other; and it has done this in France, Belgium, Germany, and Russia, precisely as it did in this country under the tariff of 1842; and therefore it has been, and now is, that the protected countries of the world increase in strength. British free trade tends to destroy competition for the purchase of raw produce, and to lower its prices, and equally to destroy competition for the sale of manufactured articles, raising their prices, as we now see to be the case with iron as our furnaces are being closed; and, therefore, it is that we see that all the free trade countries of the world diminish daily in strength and the power of self-protection.

To determine what we should do ourselves, it may not be amiss to look around and see what it is that we should desire others to do. Russia now makes a market at home for vast quantities of food consumed by the people engaged in a vast variety of pursuits that are protected against British competition. Were she to abolish protection, her factories would be closed, and there would be more food to go to England, and the price of food would fall, and you would suffer. You therefore would wish Russia to continue protection. Were Germany to abolish protection, she would have more food and wool to sell, and prices would fall, to your disadvantage. If, then, it is desirable to you that Russia and Germany should continue protection, is it not at least probable that you would be benefited by the adoption of a system that would altogether relieve you from the necessity for contending with the Russian or Polish war for the constantly diminishing market of England? Having answered to yourself that question, I would then beg you to remark that the whole tendency of the Manchester system is that of compelling you and all brother agriculturists of the world, to compete with each other for the supplying of the one market that is left open to you. You need competition for the purchase of your products, and until you can have it, prices must continue low.

It will, however, be said that protection tends to compel you to sell at Lowell and Providence even if it relieves you from the necessity for going to Manchester. Not so. Real and efficient protection tends to enable you to convert your food into iron made in your own neighborhood. It tends to enable your neighbor of Indiana to mine his coal, and apply it to the driving of spindles and looms employed in converting into cloth the cotton of Tennessee and Mississippi, received in exchange for your pork and your beef. It tends to enable Illinois to mine her coal, and apply it to the working of her lead mines, that should yield twenty pounds where now they yield but one. It tends to enable the people of Wisconsin and Michigan to find a market in the vast copper and iron region of Lake Superior. It tends to enable people to raise fax and hemp, who now raise food; and everywhere to make a local market for food, and thus to relieve the farmer from the necessity for going to either Lowell or Manchester. The present state of things tends to destroy all the small manufacturers throughout the Union, and to render you more dependent on New-England and other of the Atlantic States. Already the manufacture of cotton, South and West of New-England, has greatly decreased. The iron manufacture of your State is almost at an end, as is that of New-York and New-England; and you are becoming daily more and more dependent on Pennsylvania for that commodity, as you are becoming dependent on Massachusetts for